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Abstract. For years governments, organizations and companies have made 
great efforts to keep hackers, malware, cyber attacks at bay with different 
degrees of success. On the other hand, cyber criminals and miscreants produced 
more advanced techniques to compromise Internet infrastructure. Targeted 
attack or advanced persistent threat (APT) attack is a new challenge and aims to 
accomplish a specific goal, most often espionage. APTs are presently the 
biggest threat to governments and organizations. This paper states research 
questions and propose a novel approach to intrusion detection system processes 
network traffic and able to detect potential APT attack. This detection of APT 
attack is based on the correlation between the events which we get as outputs of 
our detection methods. Each detection method aims to detect one technique 
used in one of APT attack steps. 
Keywords: Cyber attacks, targeted attacks, advanced persistent threat, 
malware, intrusion detection system. 
1   Introduction 
Nowadays the cost of cyber attacks, malicious activities on Internet infrastructures, is 
estimated to somewhere between 100 billion to 1 trillion US dollars annually around 
the world [16]. Targeted attack or advanced persistent threat (APT) attack is a new 
challenge and aims to accomplish a specific goal, most often espionage. APTs are 
presently the biggest threat to governments and organizations [27]. These APTs create 
a problem for existent detection methods because the current techniques are based on 
known signatures of attacks and APTs often use new security holes for attacks. The 
financial losses due to a successful APT attack can be very high as it is confirmed 
through many previous research findings on APTs [24], [29], [14]. The expected 
economic effect of attacks is the major influence on investments in security measures 
[22]. 
In this paper we state our research questions and present our proposed approach for 
APT detection. In this research we are aiming to contribute to intrusion detection 
systems, particularly to APT attack detection. The goal of this work is to research a 
novel approach of intrusion detection processes network traffic and able to detect 
APT attack. The detection of APT attack is based on the correlation between the 
events which we get as outputs of our detection methods. We believe that the 
opportunity for using this approach in APTs detection is big and, to the best of our 
knowledge, still unexplored. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. State of the art is described in 
Section 2. We state our research questions in Section3. Section 4 presents our 
proposed approach for APT attack detection and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2   State of the Art 
In January 2011, Google published the first report about APT. Known as Operation 
Aurora [24]; the attack has begun in the second half of 2009. It was considerably 
large-scale and is mentioned to have targeted 34 companies, including Dow 
Chemical, Morgan Stanley, Northrop Grumman, Symantec, Northrop Grumman and 
Yahoo, as well as Google itself. Later on, other research findings on APT attack are 
reported in [15], [29], [14]. 
Some researches have been done on analyzing already identified of APTs. In [18], 
the authors showed how to detect the N most likely infected hosts of the attack; their 
approach is based on the knowledge of previous APT attacks. By improving the 
performance in terms of false positives and detection rate, they developed a search 
engine for APT investigators to quickly reveal the possible infected hosts based on the 
features of a known APT infected host. They made use of N-gram based mechanisms. 
During the year 2011, many targeted attacks were identified by Symantec. This 
large corpus of APTs was analyzed in-depth by the authors in [25]. Based on 
advanced TRIAGE data analytics, they were able to attribute many of advanced 
persistent threats to attack campaigns quite likely accomplished by the same 
individuals. They analyzed the dynamics and features of those attacks and presented 
new ideas into the modus operandi of attackers engaged in those campaigns. 
By using an undirected graph in [17], the authors showed that APTs against the 
same target could be correlated. In addition, it is possible to identify clusters and 
create a map of APT activity that may uncover the activities of single group of 
malware writers. 
With regards to detect potential targeted attack, in [12] they proposed a novel 
system to detect possible APT attack based on the information gathered on the host’s 
side. The system depends on clustering techniques to classify groups of hosts that 
have a similar behavior with respect to the suspicious resources they request (e.g., 
C&C servers, drive-by downloads or exploit kits). The system was called SPuNge and 
implemented in a working prototype. SPuNge correlates the sites and industry data in 
which those hosts run (e.g., government or gas & oil) to detect interesting attack 
activities. 
An abridged version of initial Duqu analysis was presented in [13]. A European 
corporation was targeted by a new malware, Duqu, and valuable information was 
stolen. The authors described the Duqu detector toolkit, a set of heuristic tools that 
they developed to detect Duqu and its variants. 
Given the related works presented above, most of the above works focus on 
analyzing already identified campaigns, while the scope of our work is to present a 
new approach that detect possible APT attacks, none of the related works address 
explicitly the problem of detecting potential APT attacks by means of monitoring 
network traffic and correlation between detection methods of possible techniques 
used in APT attack life cycle.  
3   Research Questions 
To achieve the goal of this work we should answer the following research questions: 
Research question 1: What are the detection methods can be used for detecting 
possible techniques used through APT attack life cycle? To answer this question we 
have proposed 8 detection methods presented in Section 4. We will try to implement 
these methods in the first phase of our research. These proposed methods are not 
fixed; we can remove or suggest a new method based on the research progress. 
Research question 2: How can we make the detection system resulting from our 
approach extensible and flexible? The attackers always try to find new techniques to 
perform APT attack, therefore each detection method should be independent from the 
other methods, so at any time we can add new method (for detecting new technique 
used in APT attack life cycle) to the system and correlate it with the other methods in 
the correlation framework. To achieve the flexibility, in the correlation framework it 
should be easy to remove or add a new rule for raising an alert on APT attack 
detection. 
Research question 3: Is this approach able to handle the network traffic in the 
real-time? The detection system should support the real-time detection because if an 
attack, or an attempted attack, is detected quickly, then it can be much easier to trace 
back the attacker, minimize the damage and prevent further break-ins. To answer this 
question, in our approach and in the first phase, the detection methods should not 
depend on storing data and then analyzing it for detection. They should be able to 
process the network traffic in the real-time and submit their events to the next phase 
for correlation.  
Research question 4: Is this approach effective? The effectiveness of the approach, 
which is its ability to detect APT attacks, should be high. This should be combined 
with a high accuracy resulting into a low number of false warnings. We expect that 
the chance at a false positive is lower when there is a direct link to other steps or 
correlation between the events. In order to achieve efficiency for our approach we 
should identify suitable rules for correlation between the events and this will depend 
on the evaluation of each detection method and will be done in the last phase of our 
research. 
4   Proposed Approach 
In this research we are aiming to contribute to intrusion detection systems, 
particularly to APT attack detection. The goal of this work is to research a novel 
approach of intrusion detection processes network traffic and able to detect APT 
attack. The detection of APT attack is based on the correlation between the events 
which we get as outputs of our detection methods. We believe that the opportunity for 
using this approach in APTs detection is big and, to the best of our knowledge, still 
unexplored. 
We will implement our proposed approach on top of Bro intrusion detection 
system [20], [21]. Bro is a passive, open-source network traffic analyzer. It is 
primarily a security monitor that inspects all traffic on a link in depth for signs of 
suspicious activity. The most immediate benefit that we gain from deploying Bro is 
an extensive set of log files that record a network’s activity in high-level terms. These 
logs include not only a comprehensive record of every connection seen on the wire, 
but also application-layer transcripts such as, e.g., all HTTP sessions with their 
requested URIs, key headers, MIME types, and server responses; DNS requests with 
replies; and much more. 
Our proposed approach, as it is shown in Figure 1, consists of two main phases: 
 
 
Fig. 1. Architecture of our proposed approach. 
In the first phase, we process the network traffic to detect possible techniques used 
in APT attack life cycle. To this end we have our detection methods; each detection 
method aims to detect one technique used in one of APT attack steps. Each detection 
method is independent from the other methods and should be evaluated before it is 
adopted. The outputs of these detection methods should be submitted to the second 
phase where correlated to raise an alert on APT attack. 
In the second phase, we have the correlation framework, this framework takes the 
events (the outputs of our detection methods) as an input and correlates them 
according to rules specified by the user (we can specify those rules based on the 
evaluation of each method) to raise an alert on APT attack detection. The correlation 
method is based on voting between the detection methods to raise an alert on APT 
attack and the detection can be based on one, two or three events. We believe that this 
correlation will reduce the false positive rate of our detection system. 
A key question in our research is: What are the detection methods can be used for 
detecting possible techniques used through APT attack life cycle. To answer this 
question taking into consideration the life cycle of APT attack, which is shown in 
Figure 2 [26], we have 8 detection methods should be implemented in the first phase 
of our research: 
 
 Fig. 2. Typical steps of APT attack. 
1. Intelligence gathering: This initial phase aims to get information about the 
target, like its organizational structure, IT environment and even about 
people who are working for that target. For this purpose, the attacker can use 
public sources (LinkedIn, Facebook, etc) and prepare a customized attack. 
2. Initial compromise (Point of entry): Performed by use of social engineering 
and spear phishing, over email, using zero-day exploits. Another popular 
infection method was planting malware on a website that the victim 
employees will be likely to visit. The most common technique used for this 
step is spear phishing emails, which may contain link to malicious website, 
malicious attachment or link to malicious file. 
Method 1, from previous findings on APTs, we have a list of exploited 
domain names (FQDNS) used in APT attack [14], we can analyze the traffic 
of possible protocols used in sending and retrieving emails and if there is a 
link to one of exploited FQDNS, we can detect spear phishing attack. 
Method 2, detection of any connection to a malicious domains based on a 
blacklist of malicious domains [7], [6], [10], [2], [1], [4].  
In case of malicious attachment, executable files supposed to end in .exe are 
made to appear as simple document files (pdf, doc, ppt, excel). 
Method 3, detecting if the content of the file is exe while the extension is not 
exe. 
Method 4, for each new file, we can calculate MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 
hash, and compare with a blacklist of file hashes (from previous findings on 
APTs) [14], if a match is found, we detect an attack. 
3. Command and control (C&C) communication: After an organization's 
perimeter has been breached, continuous communication between the 
infected host and the C&C server should be preserved to instruct and guide 
the compromised machine. These communications are usually protected by 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption, making it difficult to identify if the 
traffic directed to sites is malicious. 
Method 5, we have a blacklist of SSL certificates (from previous reports) [9], 
[19], so we can monitor SSL certificates and match with the blacklist, if a 
match is found, we detect an attack. 
Method 6, we have a blacklist of C&C servers [8], [5], [11], [3], any 
connection to one of those servers is an attack. 
Another technique can be used in this step is domain flux technique [28]; an 
exploited host may try to connect to a large number of domain names which 
are expected to be C&C servers. The goal of this technique is to make it 
difficult or even impossible to shut down all of these domain names. This 
technique leads to many of DNS query failures because not all of these 
domains are registered. 
Method 7, domain flux detection based on DNS query failure. 
4. Lateral movement: Once getting an access to the target’s network, the 
attacker laterally moves throughout the target's network searching for new 
hosts to infect. Some techniques used: Brute force and pass the hash attacks. 
5. Asset/Data discovery: This step aims to identify and isolate the noteworthy 
assets within the target’s network for future data exfiltration. 
Since the traffic of the steps 4 and 5 are inside the compromised network, we 
cannot see it. 
6. Data exfiltration: Data of interest is transmitted into external servers which 
are controlled by the attacker. There are some techniques used for data 
exfiltration like built-in file transfer, via FTP or HTTP and via the Tor 
anonymity network. 
Method 8, Tor connection detection based on Tor server list [23]. 
The blacklists of blacklist-based detection methods should be automatically 
updated each day and the detection by all methods should be in the real time. 
5   Conclusion 
In this paper we proposed a novel approach for detecting potential APT attack and 
presented the research questions which we should answer to achieve this goal.  The 
detection of APT attack is based on the correlation between the detection methods of 
possible techniques used in APT attack life cycle. We believe that the opportunity for 
using this approach in APTs detection is big and, to the best of our knowledge, still 
unexplored. 
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